A quick glance at the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and in Pakistan’s border territories will tell you that no one is playing by America’s rules.Our ally Pakistan has just signed another cease-fire in the unstable Swat Valley – a gateway to the Punjab region. Despite tens of thousands of Western troops, a Western-trained army and billions spent on infrastructure and development, Afghanistan’s government has no writ outside major cities, and recent attacks on government offices in Kabul suggest the country’s situation is precarious. Russia, looking to impede American designs, clearly induced Kyrgyzstan’s government into closing the rented American air base at Manas; the base is charged with airlifting 500 tons of cargo directed to Afghanistan each month.These events make one thing clear: America’s “War on Terror” framework is no longer working. While we view Afghanistan as a dangerous power vacuum in dire need of responsible government and development, the traditional regional players (Russia, Pakistan and various Afghan, Uzbek and Tajik tribes) often equate American intervention with imperialism. While the names and governments of Central Asia’s main players have changed, only the United States and NATO troops are really newcomers. As the carved British regimental insignias on the Pakistani side of the Khyber Pass attest, this game has been played before – only now, those British regiments are on the Afghan end of the pass.Whereas in the 1980s the United States was able to influence events in Afghanistan with large quantities of arms and money, our experience during the Soviet occupation is not immediately applicable to our situation today. Controlling a nation is far more difficult than hampering another power, as Russia seeks to do now.American policymakers should thus look elsewhere; rather than view Afghanistan as a war that can be won, they should redefine the mission and reassess long-term interests in the region. The success of the British in controlling the North-West Frontier Province and keeping Afghanistan relatively quiet provides useful insight.Lesson one: Absolute control of Afghanistan and the border provinces is unachievable. Not only are there not enough American and NATO troops on the ground, but it isn’t clear what “enough” might be – the relatively successful framework devised by Gen. David Petraeus in Iraq doesn’t translate to the region. Perhaps the best advice for Western armies occupying Afghanistan is: don’t.Lesson two: Good government and economic prosperity matter. Despite the money showered on the country at present, Afghanistan lacks basic infrastructure. There are no national railways and less than 8,000 miles of paved roads in a country the size of Texas.This point is contingent upon security; to provide for economic growth, an alternative to the Taliban – in both Afghanistan and in Pakistan’s border regions – must be provided. This means large commitments of troops over a long period of time and dangerous patrols far from major bases. Infrastructure and security concerns are largely intertwined.Lesson three: Global political implications matter – beware the Russian bear. Russian interests in Afghanistan stretch back to the 1840s; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was the logical conclusion of imperial expansion. Modern Russia is keenly aware of American difficulties, and its strengthening of ties with “independent” Central Asian republics is a reassertion of Russia’s traditional sphere of influence.A semi-stable Afghanistan is in Russian interests – Russia never overcame the problems of occupying the country in its own right, but prevention of the expansion of Western influence into the oil- and gas-rich Central Asian republics is likely a vital interest.Afghanistan is a buffer state. In dealing with a great power challenge, the United States should play hardball. More financial incentives ought to be offered to Kyrgyzstan to retain the Manas air base, if only to use it as a concession to gain leverage over Russia on other issues. Another alternative is to gain a base elsewhere in the region to further protect American interests.Lesson four: The North-West Frontier Province and Pakistan are central. Not only is Pakistan the one power that can deal with the Taliban on its soil, but a strong relationship with Pakistan will be vital in future dealings with China and India. Growing radicalization and Talibanization of Pakistani elites present a serious problem. On some level, Pakistan’s influence must extend to the North-West Frontier Province and tribal areas, lest instability spread. Pakistan’s centrality cannot be overstated.Finally, expectations must be realistic. If history is any guide, American troops will be in Afghanistan for decades. Afghanistan’s backwardness ensures that any attempts to create a modern nation-state will fail.Prudent U.S. policy, however, can more or less stabilize the country and further American interests in the region. For those who anticipate rapid success with greater troop numbers, however, Lord Salisbury is enlightening: Those who are optimistic about Afghanistan, to paraphrase Salisbury, should be given a map of the region on which the distance between frontiers is greater than the distance between the thumb and forefinger.Adam Kemal is a junior in the College currently studying abroad at St. Catherine’s College, Oxford, England. He can be reached at kemalthehoya.com. It’s a Long Way to Tipperary appears every other Friday.
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