By Blake Roberts
It always frustrates me to hear the American pirnciples I hold dear misused to defend positions that run contrary to American values.American values. It is one of the great ironies of American history that federalism and states’ rights were the weapons of choice for the defenders of slavery. In the same vein, the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibitions against racial discrimination have been twisted to argue for the end of affirmative action. Repeatedly in American history, the principles of our founding fathers have been used to argue for reprehensible positions. Sometimes, this is the intentional work of demagogues, other times an honest mistake made by a citizen who means well. What I hope is an example of the latter can be found in Robert Swope’s column, “Hate Crime Legislature Infringes Upon Freedom” (Jan. 28, p. 3).
Swope argued that the addition of a hate crime provision to the Student Code of Conduct would violate two fundamental legal principles. He argued that it would end equal treatment under the law and additionally infringe upon the rights of free speech. I disagree with both. Swope’s conclusion and the logic that supports it. The absence of a hate crime provision is a grievous error that should be addressed immediately. Such a provision would neither infringe upon free speech nor give favored treatment to any groups or individuals.
What makes this so difficult is Swope’s talent. He eloquently weaves together threads of fabrication, fear and First Amendment rights into a garment of rhetoric that hides the flaws in his argument. I am not as eloquent as he, but I will try to strip away that garment and bring to light what lies underneath.
The essence of Swope’s argument that a hate crime provision violates equal treatment is that identical actions should receive identical punishments, regardless of the intent of those actions. If all people are equal, why should the intimidation or harm of one person be any different because of the motivation underlying this action? If I smash a window and someone pushes down a menorah, why should these acts of vandalism be punished differently? After all, both are instances of vandalism, and thus are already covered by the Student Code of Conduct. Right?
Wrong. A hate crime is fundamentally different from an identical act not motivated by hate because the hate crime’s end is different. A hate crime is done to intimidate and oppress a particular group of people. The action itself is fundamentally different. Swope makes the mistake of believing that the distinction between a hate crime and a regular crime lies in the identity of the victim. Instead, the nature of the hate crime lies in the state of mind of the perpetrator. If I assault and rob an African-American man because he happens to be alone and I need some cash, that is no different from my robbing a white man for the same reasons and it would not be a hate crime. But if I choose to assault and rob a African-American because I don’t think that he belongs on this campus due to the color of his skin, that is different, and it is a hate crime.
The fact that “non-hate” crime also affects the community does not mitigate or excuse the deliberately oppressive nature of hate crime, a nature that demands more serious punishment. The people who vandalized the menorah weren’t just looking to break something that night, they chose the menorah because of its significance to Georgetown’s Jewish population. That intent is what makes their actions a hate crime, not the identity of the people they sought to harm.
Swope’s second objection to a hate crime provision is that “Hate crime legislation violates the First Amendment: it punishes people for their thoughts and speech when criminal law should be punishing them for their actions.” The problem is that actions are speech. Everything we do carries a message, especially the type of actions that would be covered by a hate crime provision. There’s a reason that burning a flag is protected by the First Amendment: it’s speech. Our speech is not limited to our words; often our actions are considered speech as well.
At this point, one would expect the response to be that since our actions are speech, our First Amendment right would preclude our being punished for the part of our actions that expresses speech. To the contrary, we are allowed to express a given right only so long as it does not infringe upon the ability of others to exercise that same right. The intimidation conveyed by hate crimes is such an infringement, and this nullifies the protection of these acts under the First Amendment. The perpetrators of hate crimes would not be punished for the “content of their ideas” but rather for the expression of those ideas in actions that infringe upon the rights of others.
Having resolved Swope’s questions of the legitimacy of a hate crime provision, we students can now call for the addition of the provision to the Student Code of Conduct. If we as students call for such a measure with the same unanimity and passion that defined the outrage with the menorah incident, we can ensure that good comes out of evil. In doing so, we will have the honor of showing another of Swope’s judgements to be incorrect: “The most likely reason [for the expression of outrage at hate crimes] is so that the group affected can use the hate crime to call for special treatment and handouts in the future.”
Instead, we will show the world that this cry of outrage emanated from the entire campus, from nearly every individual, without regard to race and creed. This call came from the common human desire to exist without fear and to thrive in a community without having to worry that its members wish you ill because of your race, gender, sexual orientation or religion. A hate crime provision is a step towards that ideal, a step towards freedom.
Blake Roberts is a sophomore in the College.
